In the Indian philosophical tradition, Mīmāṃsā philosophy holds a significant posi-tion, particularly in the field of epistemology. It primarily presents a systematic and philosophical examination of the authority of the Vedas, the concept of Dharma, and problems concerning the validity of knowledge. Mīmāṃsā philosophy has two major schools Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. Both traditions have made sig-nificant contributions to the study of epistemology, the theory of means of knowledge (pramāṇa), and the problems of truth and error. In particular, the Akhyātivāda of the Prābhākara school and the Viparītakhyātivāda or Anyathākhyāti of the Bhāṭṭa school are noteworthy contributions to the development of the Indian theories of error. Ac-cording to Mīmāṃsā, the validity of knowledge is closely related to human practical activity and the knowledge of objects as they really are. Through Akhyātivāda, the Prābhākara school does not regard erroneous cognition as completely false knowl-edge; rather, it considers the absence of discrimination between perceptual cognition and memory to be a principal cause of error. On the other hand, the Bhāṭṭa tradition presents a distinctive analysis of the origin and determination of the validity and in-validity of knowledge. The objective of the present study is to provide a philosophical analysis of the epistemological perspective of Mīmāṃsā philosophy, its theory of pramāṇa, the concepts of prāmāṇya and aprāmāṇya, and its views concerning truth and error. Furthermore, through a comparative examination of the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhā-kara schools, the study seeks to clarify the contribution of Mīmāṃsā to Indian philos-ophy and its contemporary philosophical relevance.